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ABSTRACT
In many models of corruption where enforcement is unbiased and the official maximizes
her income, the rich are more likely to pay bribes for their children’s education, implying that
corruption reduces educational inequality. We develop models of bribery that reflect the fact
that, in developing countries, anti-corruption enforcement is not unbiased, and higher income
of a household is associated with higher bargaining power and better quality of institutions. In
models of biased enforcement, the rich are less likely to pay bribes, making bribery regressive.
The OLS estimates of the effects of household income are likely to find spurious progressivity in
the incidence of bribery in schools. We exploit temporary rainfall shocks to identify the ability
to pay effect, while long-term rainfall differences identify the combined ‘poor people’ and ‘poor
area’ effects. The IV estimates show that the poor are more likely to pay bribes, and the amount
paid does not depend on household income. The evidence rejects the ability to pay and related
models based on unbiased enforcement, and is consistent with the “refusal to pay model” of
bargaining power where the rich decline to pay bribes. “Free schooling” is free only for the rich,
and corruption makes the playing field skewed against the poor.
Key Words: Corruption, Bribes, Schools, Biased Enforcement, Refusal to pay model, deter-
rence to bribe demand model, Inequality, Income Effect, Bargaining Power, Regressive Effects,
Educational Mobility
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Introduction
A large number of developing countries over the last few decades invested heavily on policies
such as free universal primary and secondary schooling, stipends for girls, free books, and mid-
day meals. The basic assumption is that such policies would lessen the burden on poor families
for educating their children, and thus help reduce educational inequality and improve economic
mobility. The evidence, however, shows that inequality has increased in many developing coun-
tries and educational mobility has not improved (World Development Report (2006), Hertz et.
al. (2007), Emran and Shilpi (2015)).
The goal of this paper is to understand whether corruption in schools constitutes part of the
explanation for the lack of improvements in educational mobility despite public policies aimed
at improving access of children from disadvantaged socioeconomic background. In Bangladesh
about half of the households reported paying some form of bribe for children’s education (Trans-
parency International Bangladesh). Evidence from a seven country study in Africa by World
Bank shows that 44 percent of parents had to pay illegal fees to send their children to school
(World Bank (2010)).2 Our focus is on the following question: who are the unfortunate half that
end up paying bribes for their children’s schooling? A canonical ability to pay model provides
us with a sharp answer: the richer households are more likely to pay bribes, and they also pay
more among the subset of bribe payers. If the ability to pay model is a valid description of the
bribery in schools, then corruption helps reduce educational inequality: only the rich pay for
their children’s schooling.3 The available empirical evidence, in contrast, is conflicting: some
showing that corruption is regressive and others suggesting progressive incidence of corruption
(see the discussion in section (2) below). Almost all of the existing evidence on the distribu-
tional effects of corruption is, however, based on OLS regressions, and does not address possible
omitted variables bias due to genetic correlations in ability and preference.
We make contributions to this literature, both theoretically and empirically. The ability
2According to a New York Times report, bribery is rife not only in school admissions in China, even the front
row seats in the classroom are up for sale¡‘A Chinese Education, for a Price”, New York Times, November 21,
2012.
3The conclusion that the rich (household with higher ability to pay) are more likely to pay bribe and pay
larger amount also arises in models where bureaucrat uses a screening device such as red tape to reveal the ability
to pay in a separating equilibrium. In these models, it is not possible for the high income households to pay
less bribes, if the bureaucrat is maximizing her income. Please see the discussion below on Banerjee (1997) and
Banerjee et. al., (2009).
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to pay and related screening models rely on an important assumption that law enforcement is
impersonal and unbiased, and thus a household’s socio-economic status is irrelevant for anti-
corruption enforcement. We develop two models where the legal and enforcement system is not
impersonal or unbiased, but works in favor of the rich to reflect the fact that higher permanent
income (wealth) confers significant social and political influence in a developing country. The
higher bargaining power of the richer households may allow them to avoid paying bribes alto-
gether, making bribery regressive. The bargaining power that derives from higher permanent
income of a household is modeled as a higher probability of punishment faced by the official
when asking for bribes.
The models differ in terms of the information set of the official. In the first model, the
standard (but heroic) assumption that the official observes all of the relevant household charac-
teristics to extract full surplus is abandoned, but the information set is still rich enough so that
the official observes income at the household level. The official infers the bargaining power from
the observed income at the household level, and the bargaining power of a household works pri-
marily as a deterrent against demand for bribes; the the richer households are less likely to face
such demand for (and pay) bribes. In the second model, the information set is more limited and
the official does not have income information to discriminate among households and demands
the same amount of bribe from everyone. A household with high bargaining power can refuse
to pay and still get the child admitted into the school. The bargaining power of richer house-
holds thus leads to refusal to pay bribes in this limited information model (henceforth called
‘refusal to pay model’), and delivers the prediction that propensity to pay bribes is a negative
function of household income, but among those who pay, the amount of bribe does not vary with
household income. The distinguishing feature of the “bargaining power as deterrence” is that,
among the households paying bribes, the amount paid increases with a household’s income, in
contrast to the ‘refusal to pay model’ where the amount paid does not vary with household
income. The theoretical analysis in this paper thus yields contrasting predictions regarding the
effects of household income on bribery.
Our empirical strategy relies on the observation that rainfall is an important exogenous deter-
minant of rural income, but short-term rainfall shocks and long-term average rainfall variations
across villages contain different identifying information. To test the ability to pay model, we
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focus on the effects of transitory rainfall shocks to income. If ability to pay is the primary mech-
anism at work, then positive transitory shocks to income would increase both the probability
that a household pays bribes and the amount paid. This is a credible test, because a transi-
tory rainfall shock is unlikely to have any significant correlation with the genetic components of
preference and ability, or with a household’s bargaining power and the enforcement regime in a
village because they are determined by permanent income.4
To estimate the effects of poverty on propensity to pay bribes and the amount paid, we
exploit the variation in long-run average rainfall across villages, and its interactions with exoge-
nous household characteristics. Again, the validity of the identification relies on the observation
that there is no credible empirical evidence that shows that the nature of genetic transmission
of ability and preference depends on long-term rainfall in a region or a country. It is impor-
tant to emphasize that we are not estimating the effects of permanent income in the standard
sense, because variation in long-term average rainfall across villages is useful for identifying the
combined “poor people” and “poor area” effects which is the focus of this paper. It captures
the poor people effect because it affects permanent income, for example, through agricultural
productivity, crop choices, and cropping intensity. Part of the “poor people” effect may also be
due to endogenous preference and ability formation, shaped by poverty as emphasized in the
recent literature (Corbin and Heckman (2016), Currie and Almond (2011), Mullainathan and
Shafir (2013)). The long-term rainfall differences capture the “poor area” effect because of the
quality of institutions including law enforcement, as they can affect the reach of formal legal
apparatus, and may have shaped the informal (relational) arrangements in a village.5 The poor
may be doubly vulnerable: they have lower bargaining power, and they also face weak enforce-
ment against corruption. The upshot of the above discussion is that the effects of poverty on
bargaining power of a household is an amalgam of different mechanisms.
The empirical evidence reported in this paper suggests that bribe taking by officials in schools
affects the poor households disproportionately; poor parents are more likely to pay bribes for
4We discuss later that our identification scheme is not compromised by the recent evidence showing a negative
effect of transitory rainfall shock at the time when a child is in utero on her/his cognitive ability.
5This is important for the interpretation and credibility of the IV estimates using long-term rainfall differences.
The exclusion restrictions we impose in this case relates to only the genetic components of preference and ability
heterogeneity; all other mechanisms are part of the causal effect of being “poor” and “living in a poor village”,
the focus of the analysis.
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education of their children, and among the bribe payers, the poor pay as much as the rich. The
results reject the unbiased enforcement models including the ability to pay model. The evidence
that the amount paid by a household does not depend on its income rejects the deterrence
version of the bargaining power model, but supports the refusal to pay version.6 We provide
suggestive evidence that the estimated effects are primarily driven by a “pure bargaining power”
effect that captures the notion that the poor are unable to inflict any costs on an official if they
ask for bribes. While enforcement heterogeneity across villages seems to play a moderate role,
we do not find any evidence that endogeneous ability and preference formation are important in
explaining the pattern of bribery.
The evidence and the analysis presented in this paper has important policy implications: free
schooling in the presence of corruption results in a perverse outcome: ‘free’ schooling is free only
for the richer households as they are not likely to pay bribes, while the poor still pay for their
children’s schooling. Without fundamental reform to improve law enforcement, free schooling
and similar policies are not likely to be effective in reducing educational inequality.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section (2) discusses the related literature and
thus help put the contributions of this paper in perspective. The next section develops testable
predictions from three models of bribe taking by school officials based on alternative assumptions
regarding the nature of enforcement regime and information set of the official. The empirical
strategy to address the potential biases from household heterogeneity is discussed in section (4).
The next section (section (5)) provides a discussion of the data sources and variables. Section
(6), arranged in a number of subsections, report the estimates from alternative econometric
approaches. The OLS results are reported in subsection (6.1), the results on ability to pay effect
using transitory rainfall shocks are discussed in subsection (6.2), and the corresponding results
for the bargaining models based on long-term rainfall variation are in subsection (6.3). The paper
concludes with a summary of the results and their implications for the broader debate about
the role of public schooling and anti-corruption measures to address inequality in educational
opportunities.
6The analysis is also useful in sorting out the conflicting evidence in existing literature. The OLS estimates
that find bribes to be regressive are likely to lead to correct conclusions, although the degree of regressivity is
underestimated. However, the OLS estimates that show progressive effects may be largely driven by unobserved
heterogeneity.
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(2) Related Literature
The economics literature on corruption is substantial and has been the focus of innovative
research in the last two decades. For recent surveys of the literature, see, for example, Olken and
Pande (2011), Banerjee et al. (2012), Rose-Ackerman (2010), Bardhan (1997).7 The literature
has, for good reasons, focused on the measurement of corruption, its effects on efficiency, and on
policies to combat corruption in different contexts. For recent contributions on measurement,
see, for example, Fisman (2001), Olken (2009), Olken and Barron (2009) and Banerjee and Pande
(2009), Hsieh and Moretti (2006), Besley et al. (2011), Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2013a, 2013b);
for contributions on costs of corruption, see, among others, Svensson (2003), Bertrand et al.
(2007), Ferraz, Finan, and Moreira (2012), Olken (2006, 2007, 2009), and on policies to combat
corruption, see, for example, Muralidharan et al. (2016), Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004),
Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2013a), Olken (2007), Banerjee et al. (2012), Kahn et al (2009).
The literature on the effects of corruption on households, and in particular on educational
inequality, is, however, limited. In an interesting recent paper, Borcan et al. (2017) show that
anti corruption efforts in schools in Romania increased the score gap between poor and non-
poor students. The available evidence on the heterogeneity in the burden of corruption in other
types of public services on households leads to conflicting conclusions. Kauffman et al. (1998),
and Kauffman et al. (2005) reported bribes to be regressive at the intensive margin as the
poor pay a higher share of their income as bribes. On the other hand, Hunt (2010) reports
evidence suggesting that corruption in health care in Uganda is progressive both at the intensive
and extensive margins. Hunt and Laszlo (2012) find that bribery is, in general, not regressive
in Uganda and Peru. The existing studies on the relationship between household income and
the propensity to pay bribes and the bribe amount paid rely on OLS regressions, and do not
analyze the biases due to unobserved heterogeneity and measurement errors. To the best of our
knowledge, we provide the first evidence on distributional effects of bribery in schools that deals
with both measurement error and unobserved heterogeneity and discriminates among ability to
pay, refusal to pay, and deterrence models of bargaining power. There is no work that deals
with the central issue of our analysis: the implications of biased enforcement for incidence of
7The early contributions to corruption literature include Rose-Ackerman (1978), Klitgaard (1988), Shleifer
and Vishny (1993).
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corruption.
Although the potential role of relative bargaining power of briber and bribee is well-recognized
in the policy analysis of corruption (see, for example, Rose-Ackerman (1996)), formal theoretical
and empirical analysis has been scant. In an important and widely cited paper on misgovernance,
Banerjee (1997) develops a model where a bureaucrat uses red tape to screen the ability to pay.
If the bureaucrat is able to distinguish the ability to pay in a separating equilibrium, we should
observe rich households paying more bribes more frequently; thus delivering conclusions similar
to the canonical ability to pay model. Please see below for a more extended discussion on this
point.
In an interesting paper on corruption faced by firms, Svensson (2003) develops a “refusal
to pay model” where sectors differ in terms of sunk costs, and a firm’s power to say no when
faced with a bribe demand depends on the sunk costs (costs of exit) in the sector it operates in.
The source of heterogeneity in power is thus not biased enforcement regime as is the case in our
analysis.
(3) Models of Bribery in Schools
We develop alternative models of bribery for admission into school under different assump-
tions about the nature of enforcement regime and the information set of the official.
The Basic Set-Up
The official has two sources of income: salary w received from employment in public schools,
and bribes for admitting students to school. The households in village j are heterogenous in
terms of their economic status as measured by income yi and bargaining power µi where i is the
household index. The probability of punishment for taking bribes from household i is δj (µi),
and we assume that the probability is increasing in the bargaining power of the household. The
village index j captures the notion that enforcement quality may differ across villages. The
bargaining power of household i depends on income and also a set of factors uncorrelated with
income ψi, i.e., µi = µ(yi, ϕi).
8 µi is increasing in both its arguments. The assumption that
bargaining power µi is a positive function of household income captures the idea that the rich in
a village have better bargaining power, given an enforcement regime δj(.). The functions δj(.)
8Since the focus of our analysis is on household income, for most of what follows in this section, we will ignore
ϕi.
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and µ(.) are common knowledge. If caught and convicted of corruption, the school official loses
her job, thus the payoff is zero in this case.
Income of household i is a function of its resource endowment Ei and ability of parents A
f
i .
The households also vary in terms of their moral costs of corruption (measured in terms of utility
loss) M fi ∈ [ML,MH ] .
The income function is:
yi = y
(
Ei, A
f
i ,M
f
i
)
with
∂y(.)
∂Ei
> 0;
∂y(.)
∂Afi
> 0 ;
∂y(.)
∂M fi
< 0 (1)
So household income is increasing in its endowment and parental ability, but is a negative
function of his moral cost M fi . A household with low moral cost can profit from corrupt deals
and activities, for example, by getting a contract through bribing. For simplicity, yi is assumed
to be discrete and households are ordered according to income as y0 < y1 < .... < y¯. Each
household has one school aged child. The quality of education received by a student i is q(Ai)
where Ai ∈ [AL, AH ] is the ability of the child. The human capital function q(Ai) is strictly
increasing and concave in ability.
In addition to possible bribes for schooling, a household spends its income on a consumption
good c. The utility function takes the following form:
Vi = R
i
qq(Ai) + u(ci −Bi)−M fi (2)
where u(.) is assumed to be increasing and strictly concave, Riq is the returns to education, and
Bi ≥ 0 is the amount of bribe. Admission into school ensures human capital q(Ai), and the
return to human capital may depend on the family connection, with rich expected to get higher
returns given their network in the labor market. However, we will ignore the heterogeneity in
returns, and focus on the implications of ability to pay, because the higher expected returns for
rich will only strengthen the conclusions below. We thus set Riq = 1 for all households.
(3.1) A Model of Bribe Determination When Official Has Perfect Information
and the Probability of Punishment Does Not Vary Across Households
We first consider a set-up where legal and enforcement systems are impersonal, and the com-
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mon probability of punishment faced by the corrupt official across different households is δ˜. All of
the existing analysis we are aware of rely on the assumption of an unbiased enforcement regime.
We also assume that the school official observes income, and the type of a household in terms
of ability and moral preference, i.e, the information set of the official is Ω = (y, Af , A,M f , δ˜).9
The school official decides whether to ask for bribes from household i given the information set.
If s/he decides to ask for a bribe, the official makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the parents. The
parents decide whether to accept the bribe demand. Then the official decides whether to admit
the child into the school.
Consider a household’s decision regarding whether to pay bribe or not for school admission
when the official makes a take-it-or-leave-it bribe demand. Given that the household cannot in-
fluence the probability of punishment, it is optimal for a household to pay bribe to get admission
for its child into the school if the bribe demand Bi satisfies the following:
q(Ai) + u(yi −Bi)−M fi = u(yi) (3)
The main results that follow from the ability to pay model are summarized in proposition
(1) below.
Proposition 1
Assume that the admission official has full information and makes a take-it-or-leave-it bribe
demand. In this case the participation constraint (3) binds for each household that sends a child
to school.
(1.a) Bribery is progressive at the extensive margin in the sense that there exists a threshold
income y˜ such that a household with income yi < y˜ (AH ,ML) is not asked for any bribe for
admission.
(1.b) There exists a threshold income yL (AH ,ML) below which a household is unwilling to
pay a positive (however small) bribe for admission.
(1.c) Among the households with a child in school, the bribe amount is a positive function
of income if the household utility function is strictly concave. In other words, bribe is ‘weakly
9This information assumption is common in many models where the official is able to extract the full surplus
from the household.
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progressive’ at the intensive margin.
(1.d) Bribes are progressive at the intensive margin (i.e., the bribe as a share of income
increases with the level of income) only if the utility function exhibits strong enough concavity.
Proof:
Omitted. See the online appendix.
Discussion
Variants of propositions (1.a)-(1.c) have been discussed in the literature before, but proposi-
tion (1.d) is new, to the best of our knowledge. Proposition (1.d) shows that even with perfect
information, the maximum bribe an official can extract is not progressive in the standard sense
if the curvature of the utility function is not strong enough. With an isoelastic utility function,
it can be shown that the bribes are progressive in the standard sense only if the utility function
has more curvature than a log function (see the online appendix).
Although the predictions that the rich are more likely to pay bribes, and pay higher amount
conditional on paying are derived in the context of a simple stylized model above, similar conclu-
sions arise in other models which share the unbiased enforcement assumption. It is instructive
to consider the versatile model developed by Banerjee (1997) and extended in Banerjee et al.
(2009). They consider a model where corruption is the result of misaligned incentives between
the bureaucrat and the government, and many different types of corruption can be considered
within a common framework. Although their focus is on allocational inefficiency and red tape,
the model can be used to understand who has to pay bribes and how much.10 The bureaucrat
can use costly screening (testing) to find out the types of the agents who are differentiated by
ability to pay and private benefit. The private benefit in their model corresponds to Riqq(Ai)
in equation (2) above, and ability to pay to yi in our set-up. If we assume that returns in the
labor market are higher for the rich households, then both private benefit and ability to pay
are higher for the richer households. The rich in our case correspond to the low type in their
model, if the goal of the free primary schooling is to provide education to the poorest. The price
set by government is zero (free schooling). Then it is easy to see that an income maximizing
official will use costly screening only if she can charge higher for the children of rich parents for
10However, a caveat is in order here, as it is likely that the authors would have built a different model if the
focus were on the effects of corruption on inequality.
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admission. Income maximization also implies that if there is limited number of slots available,
they will screen in the children from rich families.11 In fact, it is impossible to have the opposite
conclusion that the poor are more likely to pay bribes in any model that is built on the following
widely used set of assumptions: (1) bureaucrat maximizes income, (2) the high type (poor in
our case, assuming social returns are higher) has less ability to pay, (3) high type assigns higher
private value, (4) the anti corruption enforcement does not depend on household characteristics.
The intuition is as follows. Assume that the school official charges Bp and Br to the poor and
rich respectively, with Bp > Br. Also assume that the poor are more likely to pay bribes; they
are asked for bribes with a higher probability. Assume that this mechanism maximizes the bribe
income of the corrupt official. The poor can pay yp and the rich yr, with yp < yr. Then it is
obvious that yp ≥ Bp > Br. Clearly the school official can increase her income by charging the
same bribe Bp to the rich, and by increasing the probability of asking for bribes from rich to
equal that of the poor. In other words, there is a pooling equilibrium that yields more income
without incurring any costs for screening, contradicting that the official is maximizing her bribe
income.
Testable Prediction T.1: Ability to Pay Model
If heterogeneity in ability to pay across households determines the incidence of corruption,
then a transitory positive shock to income would increase both the propensity to pay bribes for
children’s schooling and the amount paid conditional on paying.
To test for the importance of the ability to pay effect, we need a source of exogenous variation
in household income that is not correlated with bargaining power derived from higher permanent
income (wealth). Thus a transitory rainfall shock to rural income would be an excellent source
of identifying information in this context.
(3.2) Heterogeneity in Bargaining Power in a Model of Biased Enforcement
In this section, we develop two models that abandon the assumption that the legal and en-
forcement regime is impersonal (the “rule of law” assumption). We emphasize that ‘bargaining
power’ is used as a portmanteau term that represents a household’s economic, social and political
11The assumption of limited slots may not be appropriate in our context, as the rural schools never decline
someone because of congestion in the classroom. The fact that half of the children who are admitted into school
do not pay bribes for admission also contradicts the limited slots assumption.
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influence and the “connections” that come with higher income and wealth in a developing coun-
try. It also represents confidence and negotiation ability that may be affected by impairment
of cognitive and noncognitive abilities and endogenous preference formation because of poverty.
Another important point to keep in mind is that poor are also victim of weak institutions be-
cause they live in a poor area where anti-corruption enforcement may be lax. For expositional
simplicity, we assume in this section that the households do not vary in terms of ability or moral
costs; the main conclusions do not depend on this simplification.
(3.2.1) A Model of Bargaining Power as a Deterrent to Bribe Demand
This subsection is devoted to the case where the information set of the school official is not
as rich as the ability to pay model, but it is assumed that the official observes household level
income. The official does not have any independent information on cognitive ability or moral
costs, and thus can try to infer them from the income information. Since the official observes
income of a household, the estimated probability of punishment is δˆi(yi) = δ(µ(yi)). Note that
once the official decides to ask for bribes from a household, it is optimal to extract full surplus
from the household, because the probability of getting caught and punished does not depend
on the bribe size. We assume that there are lower (yˆl) and upper (yˆh) thresholds of income
such that δˆ(yi) = 0 for (yi ≤ yˆl < y) and δˆ(yi) = 1 for (yi ≥ yˆh < y). Thus, we assume that
the poorest of the households have no bargaining power, while the richest ones can punish the
official for bribe taking with probability 1.
It follows that there exists a threshold ym < y¯, such that the following equality holds (as-
suming that the official maximizes expected income):
{
1− δˆ(ym)
}
[B∗ (ym) + w] = w (4)
where B∗ (ym) is the optimal bribe function. If the bargaining power effect of income is strong
enough in the sense that
dδˆ (y)
dy
is greater than a positive threshold, the official does not ask for
bribes from any household with income higher than ym defined in equation (4) (for details, see
the appendix)). The model thus predicts that when the bargaining power effect of income is
strong enough, among all households with child in school, only the relatively poor pay bribes,
the richer households (yi > y
m) are not asked for bribes, even though they have higher ability to
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pay. Higher income and the resulting bargaining power thus work as a deterrent. The testable
predictions from the bargaining power as ex ante deterrence are summarized below.
Testable Predictions T.2: Bargaining Power as Deterrence Model
Assume that the poorest households have no bargaining power, but bargaining power increases
with income, and the richest households can punish the corrupt official with certainty. The
official can observe household income. Consider the set of households with a child in school.
(TP.2) The probability that a household had to pay bribes for admission is a negative function
of income if the bargaining power effect of income is strong enough,. Among those who pay bribes,
the amount of bribes paid is a positive function of household income.
Proof: See the appendix.
(3.2.2) A Model of Bargaining Power as Refusal to Pay Bribes
The model developed in this subsection restricts the information set more and assumes that
the school official cannot discriminate across households. The sequence of events unfolds in the
following way. The official sets a bribe demand B (Ijk) where Ijk is the indicator observed by
the official for a group k in village j. We assume that the bribe B(.) is a positive function of Ijk.
We do not spell out a complete model of how the exact amount B is determined, as it is not
necessary for deriving the testable predictions. Our results are valid for any model where the
official cannot bribe discriminate among households. In some cases, the information may be so
coarse that the officials across villages charge effectively the same bribe rates. This can happen
when bribe amount is tied to national cost of living index, for example.12
When a household goes for admission of its child into the school, the school official demands
a payment of B (Ijk). The parents decide whether to pay or not. If they pay the bribe, the child
is admitted. If they decline, then the parents can deploy their bargaining power, for example,
a call to the official from the local political leader or from the office of education minister in
capital city (revealing higher bargaining power). The official estimates the probability that she
will be punished for insisting on bribes and not admitting the child, following the revelation of
household’s bargaining power. If the bargaining power is strong enough then the school official
12In fact, there is evidence that bribe rates for some public services in some countries look like market price,
because the same bribe is demanded irrespective of socio-economic background of a briber (Rose-Ackerman (2010,
1978).
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admits the child even without the bribe. We assume that the estimated probability of punishment
δˆi is a positive function of a household’s income (or wealth), i.e., δˆi = δ(yi) and
dδˆi(.)
dyi
> 0. Note
that the probability of punishment estimated by the official is a positive function of household
income in the data even though the official does not know household income, as long as the
bargaining power revealed by a household’s refusal to pay is correlated with household income.
The above model implies that the households with income higher than a threshold refuse to
pay the bribe, but still get their children admitted into the school. The threshold household
income level (denoted as yrjk < y¯) above which a household gets the child admitted after refusing
to pay bribes is determined by the following (assuming that the official maximizes expected
income):
{
1− δˆ(yrjk)
}
[B (Ijk) + w] = w (5)
Since the official cannot tailor the bribe amount to an individual household, the model
predicts that bribes for school admission are regressive both at the extensive and intensive
margins: the rich are less likely to pay bribes, and the poor pay more as a proportion of
income among the households that pay bribes for children’s admission. An important testable
implication is that the amount of bribe paid does not depend on household income. The above
discussion yields the following testable predictions about the distributional effects of bribes for
school admission which we take to data in a later section of the paper.
Testable Predictions T.3: Refusal to Pay Model
Assume that the official does not observe individual household income, but observes wealth
indicators at a group level. The household can deploy its bargaining power once the bribe de-
mand is made. The bargaining power is a positive function of a household’s income. A higher
bargaining power leads to higher probability of punishment for the corrupt official. Consider the
set of households with a child in school.
(TP.3) Then higher household income reduces the probability that parents had to pay bribes
for a child’s admission into school, but, among those who pay, the amount paid does not depend
on a household’s income.
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(4) Empirical Issues and Strategy
Our focus is on household income as an indicator of a household’s economic status. An
alternative, widely used in the existing literature, is household consumption expenditure. The
choice of consumption expenditure by many researchers is motivated by the observation that
it is less prone to measurement error compared to income. However, an important problem
with consumption expenditure as an indicator of economic status in an analysis of bribery by
households is that consumption and bribe payments are simultaneously determined, given income
(see equations (1) and (3) above). Simultaneity bias is thus a serious problem in addition to
omitted heterogeneity and measurement error in the case of household consumption expenditure.
We thus prefer income as the indicator of economic status of a household.
Consider the following triangular model for bribery for school admission at the extensive and
intensive margins. The first two equations refer to propensity to pay bribes and amount paid
conditional on paying, respectively. The third is a selection equation that captures heterogeneity
in household income.
P (Dij = 1) = β0 + β1δj + β2yij + piXij + βAAij + βMM
f
ij + βpµij + ζij (6)
Bij = θ0 + θ1δj + θ2yij + ΓXij + θ3Ijk + θAAij + θMM
f
ij + νij (7)
yij = α0 +ΠXij + αAA
f
ij + αMM
f
ij + ςij (8)
where i is the household index, and j is the village index, Dij is a binary variable that takes on
the value of 1 when the household had to pay bribes for educational services, Bij is the amount
paid, δj is a measure of enforcement in village j, yij is the income of household i in village j, Xij
is a vector of control variables, µij is household’s bargaining power, Ijk is the indicator used by
the official under the refusal to pay model, and ζij and νij are the error terms. It is important
to emphasize here that the bargaining power effect in the above empirical model (βp) does not
include the enforcement effect or the possible endogenous effects of poverty through ability and
preference formation, as we include controls for them. Below we develop the empirical model
to include such effects. To avoid confusions, we call the effect represented by (βp) as the “pure
bargaining power effect”.
We expect that βp, αM , βM , θM < 0. Since better enforcement in a village reduces the scope
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for corruption, we expect β1, θ1 < 0. As discussed before, θ2 = 0 if refusal to pay model holds
in the data. Also note that the household bargaining power does not affect the amount paid, a
prediction shared by all three models discussed in section (3) above.13 The ability to pay model
implies that β2 > 0 and θ2 > 0.
The empirical model in equations (6)-(8) makes precise the idea of higher ability to pay of
a high income household represented by the parameters β2 and θ2. Part of the difficulty in
estimating the ability to pay effect arises from the fact that the household income also captures
the effects of household bargaining power and village enforcement regime. As discussed before,
the enforcement regime in a village is likely to depend on its level of development, and the
probability is higher that a high income household chooses to live in a village with better law
enforcement due to spatial sorting based on income and amenities. We can thus decompose the
enforcement into two components, δj = λ1yij+λ2δ
−y
j , i.e., a part of the enforcement is correlated
with household income, but it is also determined by a vector of other factors uncorrelated with
income (denoted as δ−yj ). Similarly, it is useful to decompose the bargaining power of a household
into two components: µij = ω1yij + ω2µ
−y
ij , a component correlated with household income and
a second part orthogonal to income (denoted as µ−yij ). Since poverty can affect the cognitive
and noncognitive abilities and shape preference, we decompose the ability and moral costs into
genetic and non-genetic components : Aij = τ0A
f
ij + τ1yij and M
f
ij = ρ0M
gf
ij + ρ1yij.
14
Note that when cognitive and noncognitive abilities of a child are affected adversely by
poverty (τ1 > 0), the parents may expect low returns to investing in her education, suggesting
that they will be less willing to pay bribes. In contrast, when the main impact of low ability
is low confidence and negotiation ability, then we expect that the poor households will be more
likely to pay bribes, ceteris paribus. Under the assumption that moral probity is a normal good,
we expect ρ1 ≥ 0. To avoid confusions, we reiterate that this endogeneous effect of income on
preference is different from the effect of moral costs on the income of a household captured by
αM < 0 in equation (8) above.
13This captures the idea that if you are not able to refuse a demand for bribes, it is likely that you have little
bargaining power to resist the official from extracting the surplus.
14A large literature on intergenerational mobility shows that parent’s and children’s income, education, and
occupation are positively correlated. On developing countries, see Hertz et al. (2007), and Emran and Shilpi
(2011,2018), among others.
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The empirical model can now be rewritten as below:
P (Dij = 1) = β0 + βTyij + piXij + εij (9)
Bij = θ0 + θTyij + ΓXij + κij (10)
yij = ψ0 +Π1Xij + υij (11)
where we have:
βT = β2 + β1λ1 + βpω1 + βAτ1 + βMρ1
θT = θ2 + θ1λ1 + θAτ1 + θMρ1
and the error terms are:
εij = (βAτ0)A
f
ij + (βMρ0)M
gf
ij + (βpω2)µ
−y
ij + (β1λ2) δ
−y
j + ζij
κij = θ3Ijk + (τ0θA)A
f
ij + (θMρ0)M
gf
ij + (θ1λ2) δ
−y
j + νij; υij = ψAA
f
ij + ψMM
gf
ij + ςij
and the parameters in equation (11) are the rescaled parameters from equation (8), for example,
ψ0 =
α0
1− αMρ1 . Note that 1 − αMρ1 > 0 because αM < 0, and ρ1 ≥ 0. The empirical model
above in equations (9)-(11) is useful in developing a credible empirical strategy to estimate
the ability to pay effect and in discriminating among alternative models of bribery in school
developed in section (3) above. The first important point often not adequately appreciated is that
the effect of income on propensity to pay bribes (βT ) may capture a number of things including
ability to pay (β2 ≥ 0), a pure bargaining power effect (βpω1 < 0) and a quality of institutions
effect (β1λ1 < 0). Thus the common practice of interpreting the coefficient of household income
in a propensity to pay regression as ability to pay effect is likely to be misleading. The second
important point not adequately recognized in the current literature is that the nature of omitted
variables bias depends on the information set of the official. We provide a fuller discussion below.
Information Set of the Official and Omitted Variables Bias
To understand the role played by the official’s information set in stark terms, consider first
the standard ability to pay model where these are observed by the official (or has information to
estimate them reasonably well). In this case, both the propensity to pay bribes and the amount
paid conditional on paying are susceptible to bias due to omitted heterogeneity in ability and
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moral probity, as the official uses this information in her decision. In this case, the OLS estimate
is clearly biased towards finding a positive coefficient on household income because it is difficult
to control for ability and moral cost heterogeneity. This can be illustrated by the classic ability
bias applied to the present context. The demand for children’s education may be higher in richer
(high ability) households because of higher cognitive ability of children transmitted genetically
from parents to children. Moral deficiency may help accumulate wealth through corruption, and
they may also be less likely to object to paying bribes for schooling. The resulting bias in the
estimated effect of household income on probability of paying bribes is given by (denoting the
variance of the genetic component of moral cost by σ2
Mgf
) :
Cov (εij, υij) =
βAτ0αA
1− αMρ1Cov(Aij, A
f
ij) +
αMβMρ0
1− αMρ1σ
2
Mgf > 0 (12)
The last inequality reflects that fact that we expect Cov(Aij, A
f
ij) > 0, and αA, βA, τ0, ρ0, ρ1 >
0, αM , βM < 0.
15 Thus the source of positive bias in the OLS estimates of the income effects is
the genetic correlations in ability and preference regarding corruption (moral costs). Evidence
from OLS regressions showing that the rich are more likely to pay bribes is thus should be treated
with caution. Note that the endogenous formation of moral preference captured by ρ1 > 0 gives
rise to a multiplier effect in the bias due to omitted genetic ability and preference correlation.
In the deterrence model of bargaining power, the official observes household income and
estimates the ability to pay based on this information. If the official is aware that a higher
income household is likely to value children’s education more because of the expected higher
genetic endowment of ability as discussed above, then the official’s optimal decision would reflect
this positive correlation between income and ability, and the OLS estimate of the effects of income
on propensity to pay bribes and the the amount paid will be biased upward. However, we would
expect the bias to be less pronounced, in general, when compared to the bias implied by the
ability to pay model where the official observes cognitive ability directly. Similar arguments hold
for moral cost heterogeneity, the OLS estimates are biased if the official makes inference about
moral probity from household’s income information.
15The available evidence from economics and behavioral genetics shows that the correlation in cognitive ability
of parents and children is about 0.30-0.40 providing a firm basis for Cov(Ai, A
f
i ) > 0. See Black et al. (2009),
and Plomin and Spinath (2004).
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In the refusal to pay model, whether a household pays bribes once a bribe demand is made
depends on its bargaining power. Ability heterogeneity can bias the OLS estimate of the effects
of household income on propensity to pay for the following reason. How successful a parent is
in deploying her bargaining power may depend on cognitive (and non-cognitive) ability, which
would result in positive correlations among δˆ, yij and parental unobserved ability A
f
ij. The
available household surveys on corruption do not pay much attention to the information set of
the official, and it is not possible to construct an adequate proxy for Ijk. Under the refusal to
pay model, it is thus absorbed in the error term. More important is the observation that, in a
refusal to pay model, the official cannot discriminate across household’s economic status implying
Cov(yij, Ijk) = 0 in a village. If an official uses village level indicators to set significantly different
bribe rates across villages, the estimates of the effect of household income on the amount paid
should change substantially when we include village fixed effects in OLS regression.
It is important to appreciate that the possibility of incorrectly concluding that bribes are
progressive increases when we control for the heterogeneity in village enforcement regime, and
this is true irrespective of the model under consideration. When a researcher uses village fixed
effects in household level bribe regressions to control for “unobserved village heterogeneity”, the
parameter that is being estimated for propensity to pay bribes is (β2 + βpω1 + βAτ1 + βMρ1),
not (β2 + βpω1 + βAτ1 + βMρ1 + λ1β1). It is thus easier to obtain a positive coefficient from
OLS regressions with a relatively moderate amount of omitted variables bias due to genetic
components of ability and moral cost, because λ1β1 < 0. An important implication of the above
discussion is that, when one finds a negative effect of household income on the propensity to pay
bribe in OLS estimates from an empirical model with village fixed effects, it is sufficient evidence
for a regressive causal effect of bribes. However, the degree of regressivity is underestimated due
to unobserved heterogeneity in ability and preference.
(4.1) An Instrumental Variables Approach
(4.1.1) Testing Ability to Pay: The Effects of Temporary Shocks to Household
Income
To disentangle the role of ability to pay, we need a source of exogeneous variation in household
income that is uncorrelated a household’s bargaining power or potential enforcement hetero-
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geneity across villages. Transitory rainfall shocks provide us with such an exogeneous variation,
because bargaining power and enforcement quality are determined by permanent income differ-
ences.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence that short-term rainfall shock is correlated
with genetic transmission of ability and preference from parents to children. There is evidence
that a short term rainfall shock when a child is in utero can have negative effect on cognitive
ability. This, however, does not compromise our identification strategy for the following reason.
We calculate rainfall shock as the deviation of the rainfall in the immediate past year (2009)
from its 10 year average (2000-2009). Thus it is not relevant for the school children who are the
focus of our analysis; they are not in utero at the time of the rainfall shock.16 Note that, under
the null hypothesis that ability to pay model is appropriate, θ3 = 0 and the variable Ijk is not a
component of the error term κij in equation (10).
We define five dummies for five quintiles of rainfall deviations. The preliminary analysis
indicates that too little (lowest quintile) or too much (upper two quintiles) rainfall relative to
long term trend are negatively correlated with household income. These three quintile dummies
are then interacted with household head’s age and religion to generate household level variations.
There is substantial experimental evidence that the older people are more risk averse, which
implies that a rainfall shock may have different effects depending on age of the household head.
Religious minority (Hindu and Buddhist) in Bangladesh have more dense social network which
may help in risk and information sharing. We control for household head’s age and religion to
ensure that the instruments do not pick up any direct effect of these variables on propensity
to pay bribes, and on the amount paid. The estimates of the effects of household income on
propensity to pay and amount paid using the rainfall shocks will be significantly positive if
ability to pay is important in bribing decisions of the households.
(4.1.2) Estimating the Effects of Poverty and Testing Refusal to Pay Model versus
Deterrence to Bribe Demand Model
By design the transitory rainfall shock gets rid of the effects of permanent income and thus
16Perhaps more important for our conclusions is the fact that lower cognitive ability due to negative rainfall
shocks would imply that the demand for education is lower, and the poor households should be less likely to pay
bribes, contrary to the findings reported below.
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purges off the role played by enforcement and bargaining power effects of household income. To
estimate the causal effect of permanent income, i.e., βT = (β2 + βpω1 + β1λ1 + βAτ1 + βMρ1),
we exploit variations in long-run rainfall in levels, as opposed to deviations from long-run trend
used for rainfall shock in section (4.1.1) above. The instrument is defined as a dummy which
takes the value of unity if average rainfall in an area is above 75th percentile of rainfall for
the country during last 10 years (2000-2009) and zero otherwise. This high rainfall dummy
is then interacted with household head’s age and religion to generate additional exogeneous
variations. Economic activities in the villages in Bangladesh have historically been dominated
by agriculture and determined to a large extent by rainfall variations. High rainfall areas are
more flood prone in Bangladesh, submerging standing crops, and adversely affecting access to
urban markets by washing away transport and communications infrastructure, which is likely
to reduce income (Emran and Hou (2013)). We thus expect lower permanent income in high
rainfall areas. Again, we use household level variations by interacting the high rainfall dummy
with household head’s age and religion.
The litmus test for discriminating between the deterrence vs. refusal to pay models of bargain-
ing power is the effects of long-term rainfall induced differences in the permanent income on the
amount of bribe paid conditional on paying; the effect should be positive if the deterrence model is
valid, and it should be zero if the refusal to pay model is consistent with the evidence. Note that
while ability and preference heterogeneity (genetic) can bias the estimated effect under both the
deterrence and refusal to pay models, any potential bias arising from the unobservability of Ijk
is relevant only under the refusal to pay model where θ3 > 0. Thus, only if we are testing the
null hypothesis of refusal to pay model, the source of exogeneous variation in household income
should not be significantly correlated with the indicators used by the official for setting the
bribes. Since we exploit household level variations by interacting rainfall with head’s age and
religion, it is highly unlikely that our instruments would be systematically correlated with the
indicators used by corrupt officials in refusal to pay model where the official does not possess any
household level information in a village. As noted earlier, we can test the importance of village
level indicators in deciding the amount of bribes by comparing the estimates with and without
the village fixed effect in OLS regressions. If the officials do not rely on village level indicators
in deciding the bribe amount, the estimated effect of income will not change substantially when
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we include village fixed effects. The evidence below in fact shows that the effects of income on
the amount of bribes remains virtually unchanged when village fixed effects are included. The
official does not rely on village level indicators including rainfall to set the bribe amount.
To ensure that the long-term rainfall based instruments do not capture any direct effect
of age and religion on bribery, we include household head’s age and religion as controls in all
of the IV regressions. Conditional on the covariates, the exclusion restriction with regards to
the genetic components of ability and preference (for/against corruption) heterogeneity seems
plausible, as we are not aware of any credible evidence that long-term rainfall differences across
regions of country affect the strength of genetic transmissions independent of its effects through
household’s economic conditions (permanent income).
Sorting Out the Mechanisms
The effects of permanent income on propensity to pay bribes using long-term rainfall varia-
tions provides us an unbiased estimate of βT = β1λ1 + β2 + βpω1 + βAτ1 + βMρ1. The different
components of the parameter βT refer to different mechanisms through which a household’s eco-
nomic status can affect its vulnerability to corruption. We take advantage of rich data on bribe
payments for noneducational public services to create indicators of village level enforcement
and household level moral cost heterogeneity (see the next paragraph). This allows us to make
progress on understanding the role of different components by using controls for enforcement
in a village and heterogeneity in moral probity across households. However, it is not possible
to control for ability differences across households which would have allowed us to provide an
estimate of the “pure bargaining power effect” as captured by β1λ1. The reason is that the most
credible indicator of ability is the education of the household head, but it is also highly correlated
with a household’s permanent income, making it impossible to isolate the effects. Note that the
estimate of the income coefficient when controlling for indicators of moral cost and enforcement
heterogeneity is approximately: βT ≃ βAτ1 + β2 + βpω1. However, we get a credible estimate of
β2 from the IV estimate using short-term rainfall shocks as discussed above. We can thus net
out the effects of ability to pay mechanism, by using this estimate. This provides us a lower
bound estimate of the “pure bargaining power effect” βpω1 < 0 because ability bias is positive,
i.e., βAτ1 > 0.
The measures of village level enforcement and household level moral cost heterogeneity are
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constructed as follows. For moral costs, since the worry is that people with low moral costs of
corruption enrich themselves through corrupt activities, we need indicators of corruption gener-
ated income (wealth). The main sources of corrupt wealth in rural Bangladesh are credit default
(by bribing officials at the banks), land administration (bribing to grab others land), tax evasion,
agricultural services (subsidies and government loans for agriculture). The survey used in the
empirical analysis fortunately collected detailed information on household’s propensity to pay
bribes for a range of services required for wealth accumulation by a morally deficient household.
We construct a measure of household heterogeneity in corruption for income generation and
wealth accumulation by aggregating the propensity to pay bribes for these activities. As an
index of village level enforcement, we calculate the propensity to pay bribes for non-educational
services by all other households (i.e., we exclude the household under focus).
(5) Data
The data on corruption and bribe payments in acquiring educational services come from the
National Household Survey on Corruption 2010 (NHSC, 2010) conducted by the Transparency
International of Bangladesh (TIB). Using the Integrated Multipurpose Sampling (IMPS) Frame
developed by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics as the sample frame, the survey selected
300 primary sampling units (PSUs) from 16 strata. The IMPS identified 1000 PSUs using the
2010 population census as the frame. The PSU borders are defined to be contiguous census
enumeration blocks (usually about 2 blocks) and consists of 200 households. Note that with
200 households a PSU would be a small geographic unit in the context of Bangladesh where
population density is very high. According to 2011 population census (preliminary report), per
square kilometer population in Bangladesh is 964. The average household size in our sample is
5.84, which would imply that a PSU covers somewhat larger area than one square km. Thus
PSU can be treated as a small village in most of the cases.
From each PSU, 20 households were selected randomly, giving us a total sample of 6,000
households. The sample used in our empirical study is however smaller (3605). Because we
restrict the sample to those households who reported using educational services during the survey
year to make sure that the households that face a zero probability of paying bribes for education
are excluded. This reduces the sample size to 4876. Since incomes of households in metropolitan
city corporations are not likely to be affected significantly by rainfall, we drop 851 households
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living in metropolitan areas. We also drop 257 households who reported having no school age
children (age 6-20 years), 2 households that failed to report the gender of the household head,
and another 161 households did not use any of the income generating non-educational public
services. Our final sample thus consists of 3,605 households.
The NHSC 2010 collected detailed information on 13 different types of services usage, and
corruption faced by households in obtaining those services. In the case of education, an adult
member of the household was asked detailed questions about facing bribery regarding different
educational services. The bribe questions were organized in four main categories: bribe payment
for (i) admission into school, (ii) receiving free books, (iii) receiving scholarships, and finally (iv)
implicit bribe payment in the form of paying fees or donations without receipts. Using responses
to these questions, we define an overall propensity to pay bribes for education services as a
dummy which takes a value of unity if household reported to pay any of these four types of explicit
or implicit bribe and zero otherwise. Since paying without receipts is common in Bangladesh,
and many people may not view it as paying bribes, we define an alternative propensity to
pay bribe variable by excluding ‘paying without receipt’ as a bribe category. We also make
a distinction between bribe paid for admission and all other types of bribe. Appendix Table
A1 reports the summary statistics for different bribes related to education (please see online
appendix). About 48 percent of the households reported to have paid bribe including payments
made without receipts. Among the sub-categories, bribe for school admission is reported by
10 percent, for free books by 6 percent and for drawing scholarship money by 4 percent of the
households. All together 18 percent of the households paid bribe for admission, free books and
scholarships. About 40 percent of the households reported making a payment without receipts.
In the empirical analysis we present results on both the overall propensity to pay bribe (including
payment without receipts) and the sub-categories as well. As to be expected, the sample used
for the analysis of the intensive margin (i.e., the amount of bribes paid) are smaller, about 1747
households, because about half of the households with children in school do not pay bribes.
The amount of bribe paid includes payments made for any of the four different categories of
bribe defined above. Among the households who reported positive amount of bribe payment,
on average a household paid about Taka 247 during the survey year. To get a better sense of
the financial burden imposed on the poor, it is instructive to look at the average bribe paid as a
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proportion of the household savings. The average bribes paid in schools is 9 percent of average
annual household savings, while for the first and second quintile it amounts to 83 percent and
28 percent of annual household savings respectively. Bribes paid for schooling of the children
can thus be a substantial burden on the poorest households.
The NHSC 2010 collected information on household size and the number of school-aged
children, household head’s age, gender, and religion. We use this information to define control
variables for our regression analysis. The survey also collected information about household’s
total monthly income and expenditure. Summary statistics for all of these variables are provided
in the online appendix Table A1.
For the instrumental variables analysis, we need rainfall information which are not collected
in the NHSC survey. The rainfall data are drawn from Bandyopadhyay and Skoufias (2012).
The original data on rainfall come from the Climate Research Unit (CRU) of the University of
East Anglia. The CRU reported estimated monthly rainfall for most of the world by the half
degree resolution from 1902 to 2009. The CRU estimation combines weather station data with
other information to arrive at the estimates. To estimate the thana level rainfall from the CRU
data, Bandyopadhyay and Skoufias (2012) uses area weighted averages.17
(6) Empirical Evidence
We begin with preliminary evidence on the extent and pattern of bribery in schools. The
first interesting point to note is that the average per capita income of the bribe payers (Tk. 1930
per month) is much lower compared to the average per capita income of non-payers (Tk. 2580
per month). This indicates that on average the households that end up paying bribes for their
children’s education are relatively poor. To explore further the partial correlations in the data,
we report a series of OLS regressions with alternative sets of controls.
All standard errors reported in this paper are clustered at PSU level if not reported oth-
erwise.18 Clustering at the PSU level is motivated by two factors. First, households living in
a village face similar choices in terms of school access and quality. Second, the first stage of
17For example if an Upazila/thana covers two half degree grid cells for which CRU has rainfall estimates, then
upzila/thana rainfall is estimated as the average rainfall of the two grid-cells, where the weights are the proportion
of the area of the upazila/thana in each grid-cell. For details, please see Bandyopadhyay and Skoufias(2012).
18PSU is a geographic unit approximately equal to a one square Km in our data set. All the conclusions in this
paper remain valid if we cluster the standard errors at the Thana level which is a somewhat larger geographic
unit than the PSU.
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stratified random sampling used in NHSC 2010 selected 300 PSUs from the IMPS sample frame
of 1000 PSUs, as discussed above in the data section. All of the regressions also include regional
dummies (six regions called ‘divisions’) to account for any spatial differences.19 The household
level controls include household head’s age, gender, a dummy for religion (=1 if muslim and zero
otherwise), household size and number of school age children.
(6.1) OLS Estimates
Table 1 provides the OLS estimates of the coefficients on per capita income in the regressions
of propensity to pay bribes and the amount paid as bribe. The Probit estimates are similar
and omitted for brevity. The results for propensity to pay bribes for different types of schooling
services are presented in panels A-D of Table 1, while panel E reports the estimates for the bribe
payments. In addition to an overall indicator of bribing propensity that aggregates bribery for
various educational services in panel A, we provide estimates for three disaggregated categories in
panels B-D: bribing for admission, bribe payments with receipts, and payments without receipt.
For each indicator of bribery, we report estimates from 4 different specifications across columns.
The simplest specification in column 1 includes only a vector of household controls such as age,
gender and religion of household head, along with regional fixed effects, but no controls for
moral cost or village enforcement regime are included. The OLS estimate in column 1 shows
that the effects of higher household income are consistently negative for propensity to pay bribe,
across three categories, and also in the aggregate. This provides suggestive evidence that the
propensity to pay bribes for educational services may be lower for a higher income household.
The estimated effect of household income on the amount paid as bribe is, however, positive
and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The evidence in column 1 thus seems to
suggest that, among the bribe payers, the richer household pay more, implying that bribes are
progressive at the intensive margin which we show later is an incorrect conclusion.
The second column adds a measure of household’s corruption generated income to address the
bias due to moral cost heterogeneity, and the estimate is a bit smaller in magnitude (compared
to that in column 1).20 The specification in the third column of Table 1 introduces a control for
19Note that although Rangpur became the 7th division at the beginning of 2010, the NHSC 2010 data are
organized based on the six divisions before 2010. The results and conclusions reported below, however, do not
depend on the inclusion or exclusion of regional fixed effects.
20The coefficient of the propensity to bribe for income generating activities is positive and statistically signif-
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differences in enforcement regimes across villages: the average propensity to pay bribes for non-
educational public services in a village (excluding the household i). If the enforcement is weak
in a village, the incidence of bribery will be higher, ceteris paribus.21 For all four measures of
propensity to bribe, the effect of higher household income is negative, but numerically smaller in
column (3) compared to the corresponding estimates in column (1), suggesting a less regressive
effect, consistent with the theoretical insights and the empirical model that weak enforcement
in low income villages affect the poor adversely. The estimates in column (3) of panel E suggest
that the amount paid increases with income, but the numerical magnitude of the effect does not
vary significantly between columns (2) and (3), and the magnitude is somewhat larger in column
(1).
The last column in Table 1 reports estimates from a specification where we use village fixed
effects instead of village level controls for heterogeneity in enforcement regime. The main conclu-
sions remain intact, although the numerical magnitudes of the estimated effect are significantly
smaller. It is important to emphasize that a negative coefficient on income estimated in the speci-
fication with village fixed effect in column (4) is sufficient to establish that bribes for education are
regressive at the extensive margin, although OLS underestimates the degree of regressivity. The
positive effects estimated for the amount paid, however, cannot be taken at face value, because it
can be an artifact of omitted ability and moral cost heterogeneity due to genetic transmissions.
A comparison of columns (1) and (4) for panel E shows that the estimate of the effects on
the amount paid does not change when we include village fixed effects. This implies that the
amount paid does not vary across villages. Perhaps the more important implication relates to
the refusal to pay model: the officials do not use village level indicators including rainfall to set
the bribe amount. This is important evidence in favor of rainfall-based identification under the
null hypothesis that the refusal to pay model is valid.
The evidence also suggests that the regressive effects found in some existing studies based on
OLS regressions may not be widely off the mark, while the studies that find progressive effects
icant at the 1 percent level in all regressions for propensity to pay bribe. Note that this controls for both the
genetic and nongenetic components of preference, and thus the estimates are lower bounds.
21The average propensity to pay bribe for non-educational services by other households in the village has
positive and statistically significant coefficients in the regressions for payments without receipt and aggregate
propensity to pay bribe.
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in OLS should be interpreted with due caution.
(6.2) Ability to Pay: Instrumental Variables Estimates Using Transitory Rainfall
Shocks
The estimated effects of household income variation that arises from transitory rainfall shocks
are reported in Table 2. The first four columns refer to propensity to pay bribes. Starting with
the estimates for aggregate propensity (adding up admission, other payments with and without
receipts) in column (1), we report estimates for three disaggregated categories of educational
services in columns (2)-(4). The last column reports the estimates for the amount of bribe paid.
To ensure that the IV estimates do not suffer from weak instrument bias, we follow a proce-
dure suggested by Rajan and Subrahmanian (2008). We first use the transitory rainfall shock
based instruments to predict household income from a “zero stage” regression. Then the pre-
dicted income is used as the single instrument in a just identified model. As pointed out recently
by Kolesar et al. (2014), this procedure requires that only the predicted income satisfies the
exclusion restriction, which is a weaker assumption than exclusion restrictions imposed on the
individual instruments separately. The first stage results for various specifications of propensity
to pay equation show that the transitory rainfall shock based instruments are strong enough to
identify the effects of a transitory change in household income; the Angrist-Pischke F statistic
in each case is higher than the Stock-Yogo critical value of 9.08 for 10 percent maximum rel-
ative bias. When estimating the effects of household income on the amount paid conditional
on paying, the power of the instruments is a bit lower but adequate in specifications with no
controls for village level enforcement heterogeneity. Thus the estimates for the causal effect of
household income on amount paid conditional on paying do not suffer from weak instrument bias
when no controls for village enforcement is used. However, the Angrist-Pischke F statistic for
the specification including an indicator of enforcement in the village is 7.73, and some readers
may worry that these particular estimates may not be free of weak instrument bias. We thus
check estimates from alternative estimators such as Fuller LIML and CUE-GMM for the amount
of bribe paid that are robust to weak instrument bias, in addition to the 2SLS estimates. As
noted by Stock and Yogo (2005), if there is significant weak instrument bias, the estimates from
Fuller-LIML and CUE-GMM will differ substantially from the 2SLS estimates.
The estimates from three different specifications for propensity to pay bribes point to a robust
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conclusion: there is no evidence of a significant effect of transitory changes in household income;
none of the estimates are statistically significant at the 10 percent level across specifications
and different categories of bribe payments. The IV estimate for the amount paid as bribes is
reported in the 5th column in Table 2; the estimate is consistently positive, but, again, none of
the estimates are significant at the 10 percent level. For the specification that includes a control
for enforcement heterogeneity across villages, the Fuller-LIML and CUE-GMM estimates are
very close to the 2SLS estimate, thus allaying worries about weak instrument bias (not reported
in Table 2). The estimates from Fuller-LIML and CUE-GMM are omitted for the sake of brevity
and are available from the authors. The results, taken together, do not provide support for an
important ability to pay effect in distributional consequences of bribery in schools.
(6.3) Instrumental Variables Estimates of the Effects of Poverty (“Being Poor
and Living in a Poor Village”)
In this subsection, we discuss the estimates using long-term rainfall variations across vil-
lages. The estimates represent the causal effect of a household’s economic status, i.e., (βT ), and
represent the combined “poor people” and “poor area” effects.
The 2SLS estimates are reported in Table 3, and the presentation of the results follow that in
Table 2. The conclusions do not depend on the exact time window (2000-2009) used for defining
the long-term rainfall instrument; see Table 4 for estimates with a different time window (2005-
2009). The results and conclusions are similar if we use the Rivers and Vuong (1988) two-step
conditional maximum likelihood estimator for the propensity to pay estimates (reported in the
online appendix).
The first striking observation that comes across from Table 3 is that household permanent
income has a consistently negative, statistically significant, and numerically substantial effect on
the aggregate propensity to pay bribes for children’s schooling, providing strong evidence that
bribery in schools is regressive at the extensive margin. As discussed in the theoretical section
above, this contradicts any model based on the following set of assumptions: (i) the returns to
education is higher for the rich, and their ability to pay is higher, (2) the school official maximizes
her income, (3) the official can use costly testing to screen in the rich (or screen out the poor),
and (4) the enforcement regime is unbiased: punishment for corruption does not depend on
household characteristics.
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The disaggregated estimates in columns (2)-(4) show that the effect observed in aggregate
propensity to pay is driven by bribery for admission into schools and payments with receipts; the
estimates are not statistically significant at the 10 percent level for payments without receipt.
When compared to the corresponding OLS estimates in Table 1, the estimates, especially for
propensity to pay bribes for admission and payments with receipt, are numerically much larger.
For example, the estimate for admission is −0.15 using long-term rainfall IV, while it is only
−0.0084 according to the OLS estimate. This vindicates the worry that the OLS estimates are
biased towards finding less regressive effects of bribery.
Perhaps, the most striking result in Table 3 relates to the effects of household permanent
income on the amount paid as bribes. In contrast to a statistically significant positive effect
found in all of the OLS estimates in Table 1, the long-term rainfall IV estimates show that
the effect is not statistically significant at the 10 percent level, and this conclusion is robust
across three different specifications. The estimates in Table 3 thus suggest strongly that, among
those who end up paying bribes, the poor pay the same amount for educational services as the
rich do. This has important implications: (i) it rejects the model based on bargaining power
as deterrence, and provides support for the refusal to pay model, (ii) it is not consistent with
any model where the school teacher is able to use screening device to reveal ability to pay in
a separating equilibrium, and (iii) it implies that bribes are regressive at the intensive margin,
because a constant amount irrespective of income implies that the poor pay higher as a share of
their income.
Understanding the Mechanisms
The focus of our analysis is to understand the effects of poverty on vulnerability to corruption
in the context of bribery in schools. As discussed in details above, the effects captured by the
parameter βT include a variety of mechanisms, and the evidence in Tables (2) and (3) are useful
in sorting out the relative roles played by some of the mechanisms. From Table (2), we find that
the ability to pay effect is approximately zero, i.e., β2 = 0. A comparison of the estimates in the
top and middle panels of Table (3) suggest that the role played by moral costs heterogeneity
is limited; the estimated effect of permanent income on the aggregate bribe propensity declines
marginally from -0.139 to -0.133 when we control for moral cost heterogeneity in the regression,
and the estimates of the effects on the propensity to pay bribes for admission remain virtually
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identical. This can be interpreted as suggestive evidence that βMρ1 w 0. To understand the im-
portance of weak enforcement regimes in poor villages, it is instructive to compare the estimates
at the top panel of Table 3 (without controls for enforcement heterogeneity) with those in the
bottom panel (includes controls for enforcement heterogeneity). The estimated income effect for
aggregate bribing propensity declines from -0.139 to -.0.129, which implies that the effects of
enforcement heterogeneity is larger than that of moral costs heterogeneity. But the effects in
the case of bribery for admission is again zero, similar to the case of moral cost heterogeneity.
As discussed earlier, it is not possible to check the sensitivity of the estimates by including
indicators of ability such as education, as they are highly correlated with permanent income
and would wipe-off much of the causal effect we are interested in. Thus the estimated effect
of permanent income in the bottom panel of Table 3 represents the combined effect of “pure
bargaining power” and any endogeneous response of ability to poverty. However note that we
expect βAτ1 > 0, because βA > 0 (higher ability implies higher returns to education and more
willingness to pay), and τ1 > 0 (higher ability implies higher income which improves nutrition
and health leading to higher ability).22 Thus the estimated negative effect of permanent income
should be interpreted as a lower bound estimate of the “pure bargaining power effect”.
Interpretation of the IV Estimates
Since we exploit variations in the rainfall for identification, one might argue that the IV
estimates are relevant only for those households whose income primarily depends on the agricul-
tural sector (land owners and agricultural wage laborers). However, high rainfall and flood in a
village not only affect the agricultural sector, they also affect the income in the rural non-farm
sector adversely, as the demand for non-farm products goes down. The IV estimates are thus
likely to be relevant for the vast majority of the households in the villages and small towns in
Bangladesh.
Magnitudes of the Effects
The parameter estimates in Tables 1-3 provide marginal effects of an increase in income by
a unit (by 1000 taka since income is expressed in thousand taka) but they are sensitive to the
unit of measurement of income. To provide a sense of the magnitude of the effects, we compute
22The recent evidence shows that poverty affects the development of brain of a child in a significant way (see
Noble et al. (2015)).
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elasticities at the mean values of income and relevant propensity to pay bribe. The average per
capita monthly income in our sample is around $28 and 1 percent increase in income is thus
equivalent to 28 cent increase. According to the estimates in Table 3, the largest effect of an
increase in income by one percent is found for propensity to pay bribe for admission. When
considering total causal effects of household income (i.e., the estimate of the parameter βT using
long term rainfall as IV), a 1 percent increase in income reduces propensity to pay bribe for
admission by 3.32 percent, for payments with receipt by 1.80 percent and for payments without
receipt by 0.46 percent. The decline in aggregate propensity to pay bribe is about 0.61 percent.
(7) Conclusions
This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of distributional effects of corrup-
tion in schools in developing countries where law enforcement is not impersonal or unbiased.
We develop three alternative models based on contrasting assumptions regarding the nature of
enforcement regime and the information set of the corrupt official. The empirical analysis yields
both substantive and methodological insights. The IV estimates using short-term rainfall shock
show that the canonical ability to pay model is not supported by the evidence. We provide
estimates of the effects of “being poor and living in a poor village” on bribery in schools by ex-
ploiting long-term rainfall differences across villages. The results show that corruption in schools
is regressive both at the extensive and intensive margins. We find that the amount paid does
not vary significantly with household income which rejects the ability to pay model, screening
models with separating equilibrium under unbiased enforcement, and a version of the bargaining
power model under biased enforcement that assumes that the official observes household level
income (or wealth). The evidence on both the intensive and extensive margins is consistent with
the “refusal to pay model” where the official does not observe household level income (cannot
use screening to reveal that information), and the bargaining power of a household manifests
itself as “power to say no” once a bribe demand is made.
The empirical analysis also suggests that the OLS estimates of the effects of household income
on propensity to pay bribes and the amount paid are significantly biased towards finding less
regressive or even spurious progressive effects. The evidence and the analysis in this paper
has important implications for understanding the often conflicting evidence on distributional
effects of corruption on households found in the existing literature based on OLS regressions, as
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discussed in the literature review section above. While the evidence of regressive effects found in
OLS regressions are likely to be valid (although magnitudes are underestimated), the progressive
effects found in many existing OLS based studies may be driven largely by biases due to omitted
ability and preference heterogeneity.
The recent evidence shows that intergenerational correlation in schooling, a standard measure
of immobility in education, does not show any improvements in a large number of developing
countries over the last few decades (Hertz et al. (2007), Emran and Shilpi (2015)). In fact, in
the case of Bangladesh, Hertz et al. (2007) find that intergenerational educational mobility has
worsened over the years. This widening inequality in educational opportunity may seem difficult
to reconcile with the standard theory developed by Becker and Tomes (1979) and Solon (2004),
according to which policies such as free schooling should improve educational mobility and reduce
inequality. Our analysis points to corruption in schools as a potentially important factor behind
the persistence of educational immobility and inequality. Even though schooling is supposed to
be free (or highly subsidized) for the poor to make the ‘playing field’ level, the evidence presented
in this paper suggests that the burden of bribery in schools falls disproportionately on the poor
households, and skews the ‘playing field’ against them.
APPENDIX
Proof of Testable Prediction (T.2)
Given the assumptions that the poorest do not have any bargaining power and the richest
can punish the teacher with certainty, it follows that there exists a threshold yM < y¯, such that
the following equality holds (assuming that the teacher maximizes expected income):
{
1− δˆ(yM)
} [
B∗
(
yM
)
+ w
]
= w (13)
It is easy to check that the expected income from bribery
{
1− δˆ(y)
}
[B∗ (y) + w] is a de-
creasing function of income if the bargaining power effect of income is strong enough in following
sense:
δˆ
′
(y) >
B∗
′
(y)
(
1− δˆ(y)
)
[B∗ (y) + w]
(14)
Thus equation (13) and inequality (14) imply together that when the bargaining effect of
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income is strong enough to satisfy inequality (14), ∀ yi > yM , the following inequality holds:
{
1− δˆ(yi)
}
[B∗ (yi) + w] < w (15)
When inequality (15) is satisfied, it is optimal for the teacher not to ask for bribes facing a
household with income yi > y
M .
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Table 1: Household Income and bribery in schools (OLS Estimates) 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Panel A 
 Propensity to pay bribe (aggregate) 
Per capita income -0.0383*** -0.0363*** -0.0335*** -0.0169*** 
 (-8.224) (-7.970) (-7.147) (-3.791) 
 Panel B 
 Propensity to pay bribe for admission  
Per capita income -0.0121*** -0.0113*** -0.0103*** -0.00791*** 
 (-5.333) (-5.001) (-4.468) (-2.848) 
 Panel C 
 Propensity to pay bribe with receipts 
Per capita income -0.0248*** -0.0238*** -0.0224*** -0.0155*** 
 (-8.440) (-8.229) (-7.623) (-4.342) 
 Panel D 
 Propensity to pay bribe: Payment without receipt 
Per capita income -0.0293*** -0.0281*** -0.0261*** -0.0107** 
 (-6.592) (-6.382) (-5.827) (-2.432) 
Observations 3,605 3,605 3,605 3,605 
 Panel E 
 Total Amount paid as bribe 
Per capita income 0.0786*** 0.0783*** 0.0762*** 0.0796*** 
 (2.831) (2.851) (2.965) (4.582) 
Observations 1,747 1,747 1,747 1,747 
Household Level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Moral Cost No Yes Yes NA 
Village level controls     
Enforcement in the Village No No Yes NA 
Village fixed effects No No No Yes 
Regional Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes NA 
Notes: (1) Standard errors are clustered at primary sampling unit (village) level.  (2) Each cell in the rows labelled 
per capita income represents result from a separate regression. (3) Robust t statistics in parentheses 
(4) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Testing Ability to Pay Effect: Estimates with Rainfall Shock as IV (2SLS) 
 Propensity to Pay Bribe Amount Paid 
  Aggregate Admission With receipt Without Receipt  
   
Per capita income -0.0401 -0.0777 -0.0675 -0.0176 0.0797 
 (-0.447) (-1.449) (-1.204) (-0.196) (0.507) 
First stage F Statistic 11.60 11.60 11.60 11.60 9.075 
Controls for Moral Cost Heterogeneity   
Per capita income -0.0321 -0.0754 -0.0642 -0.0125 0.0807 
 (-0.364) (-1.400) (-1.144) (-0.139) (0.518) 
First stage F Statistic 11.68 11.68 11.68 11.68 9.109 
Controls for village Enforcement Heterogeneity    
Per capita income -0.00888 -0.0727 -0.0564 0.00482 0.0551 
 (-0.0976) (-1.284) (-0.957) (0.0507) (0.298) 
First stage F Statistic 10.13 10.13 10.13 10.13 7.726 
Household Level 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at primary sampling unit (village) level. Each cell in the rows labelled per capita 
income represents result from a separate regression. Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 3: Refusal to Pay vs. Deterrence Models: Estimates with Long-term Rainfall as IV 
 Propensity to Pay Bribe Amount Paid 
  Aggregate Admission With receipt Without Receipt  
   
Per capita income -0.139** -0.149** -0.143*** -0.0853 0.0334 
 (-2.251) (-2.527) (-2.647) (-1.387) (0.388) 
First stage F Statistic 11.23 11.23 11.23 11.23 12.41 
Controls for Moral Cost Heterogeneity   
Per capita income -0.133** -0.148** -0.141*** -0.0812 0.0319 
 (-2.136) (-2.487) (-2.596) (-1.289) (0.366) 
First stage F Statistic 11.14 11.14 11.14 11.14 12.35 
Controls for Village Enforcement Heterogeneity    
Per capita income -0.129** -0.149** -0.141** -0.0779 0.0336 
 (-2.058) (-2.437) (-2.551) (-1.202) (0.365) 
First stage F Statistic 11.22 11.22 11.22 11.22 12.18 
Household Level 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regional Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at primary sampling unit (village) level. Each cell in the rows labelled per capita 
income represents result from a separate regression. Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 4: Refusal to Pay vs. Deterrence Models: Robustness Check  
(Estimates from 2005-2009 rainfall IV) 
 Propensity to Pay bribe Amount 
  Aggregate Admission With receipt Without Receipt paid as bribe 
      
Rainfall Shock IV      
Per capita income -0.0115 -0.0650 -0.0495 -0.00174 0.0641 
 (-0.124) (-1.190) (-0.849) (-0.0180) (0.358) 
First stage F Statistic 10.16 10.16 10.16 10.16 8.497 
      
Long-term Rainfall  IV     
Per capita income -0.116* -0.142** -0.119** -0.0770 0.0654 
 (-1.716) (-2.258) (-2.196) (-1.107) (0.632) 
First stage F Statistic 10.19 10.19 10.19 10.19 9.576 
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(1) Proof of Proposition 1
(1.a) A teacher does not ask for bribes facing a household with income yi < y˜ (AH ,ML)
where y˜ (AH ,ML) is defined by the following equation:
{
1− δ˜
}
[B∗ (y˜ (AH ,ML)) + w] = w (1)
where the maximum bribe a household i is willing to pay and still send the child to school
is B∗i , implying that at this bribe the participation constraint (3) in the main text of the
paper binds. Now note that within the subset of households (AH ,ML), the maximum bribe
that can be extracted is a negative function of income, given strict concavity of the utility
function. The proof then completes by the observation that y˜ (AH ,ML) = Mini (y˜ (Ai,Mi))
where y˜ (Ai,Mi) is defined analogously to equation (1) above.
(1.b) A household i is willing to pay a positive amount of bribe and send the kid to
school if u
′
(yi) < q(Ai) − Mi. Denote the income threshold yL (AH ,ML) such that the
1We are grateful to Matthew Lindquist, Dilip Mookherjee, Hillary Hoynes, Jeffrey Wooldridge, Larry
Katz, Rajeev Dehejia, Arif Mamun, Ali Pratik, Paul Carrillo, Virginia Robano, Rafiqul Hassan, Niaz
Asadullah, Zhaoyang Hou and seminar participants at Monash University for helpful discussions and/or
comments on earlier drafts. We thank Transparency International Bangladesh and Iftekhrauzzaman for
access to the NHSC (2010) data used in this study. The standard disclaimer applies.
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following holds: u
′
(yL (AH ,ML)) = q(AH) − ML. So among the households with the
highest ability and lowest moral cost, any household with income yi < y
L (AH ,ML) is
unwilling to pay even an infinitesimally small positive amount of bribes. Now observe that
q(AH)−ML = Max (q(Ai)−Mi) . Since u(yi) is concave, this implies that yL (AH ,ML) =
Min
(
yL (Ai,Mi)
)
.
(1.c) Consider the subset of households with a given combination of ability and moral
cost Ai,Mi. So the heterogeneity in income within the group derives from endowment
differences. By implicit function theorem:
∂ B∗i (Ai,Mi)
∂yi
=
u
′
(yi −Bi)− u′ (yi)
u′ (yi −Bi) > 0 , ∀B
∗
i > 0, because u(.) is strictly concave.
Since the income function implies that higher ability and lower moral cost increase income
given a resource endowment Ei, the teacher can extract more bribes when facing a household
with high ability and low moral cost.
(1.d) A progressive bribe function implies that the elasticity of bribe amount with
respect to income is greater than 1. Thus we require:
∂ B∗i
∂yi
yi
B∗i
> 1⇒ 1− u
′
(yi)
u′ (yi −B∗i )
>
B∗i
yi
(2)
Because from (1.c) above we have:
∂ B∗i (Ai,Mi)
∂yi
= 1− u
′
(yi)
u′ (yi −B∗i )
(3)
Note that the higher the second derivative of the utility function (in absolute magnitude),
the more likely it is that inequality (2) above will be satisfied.
Consider the isoelastic utility function:
u(c) =
 c
1−γ−1
1−γ for γ > 0 and γ ̸= 1
log(c) for γ = 1
2
In this case, inequality (2) reduces to
1−
[
(yi −B∗i )
(yi)
]γ
>
B∗i
yi
(4)
An inspection of the left hand side of inequality (4) shows that it reduces to
B∗i
yi
when
γ = 1. Thus inequality (4) is violated even though utility function is concave, when γ ≤ 1.
To get a progressive bribe function, we require a utility function with stronger diminishing
marginal utility than implied by the log function.
(2) Heavy Rainfall and Interactions Based Instruments: What Do They
Represent?
We use the interactions of heavy rainfall dummy with exogeneous household charac-
teristics as identifying instruments. The interactions as instruments exploit possible het-
erogeneity across households in the effects of heavy rainfall. For example, we expect that
heavy rainfall (and flood) will have stronger effects on the income of those households who
rely more on agriculture, such as farming households and agricultural wage laborers (un-
skilled labor). Thus an obvious way to introduce household heterogeneity is to interact the
land owned by a a household with the heavy rainfall dummy. However, there is an impor-
tant objection to this. To ensure that the exclusion restriction imposed on the interaction
of rainfall is reasonable, we need to control for direct effects of land (possibly nonlinear),
which would nullify a large part of the income effect we are trying to capture using rainfall
variations for identification.
We thus use other indicators of household heterogeneity such as the age of the house-
hold head and religion. Both of these characteristics are clearly exogeneous in the context
of Bangladesh, as religion is not a choice (determined at birth) for most people, because
conversion is rare. The effects of rainfall on income may vary with the age of the household
head, because a household with older head is more likely to be in agricultural occupation
and thus be more exposed to rainfall shocks. Also, as noted in the manuscript, there is
substantial evidence that degree of risk aversion increases with age. On the other hand, a
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household headed by younger individual will be better able to withstand a negative shock
such as flood; a young individual has more energy, and is more likely to take advantage
of temporary migration to nearby town in response to a negative rainfall shock. Thus we
would expect heavy rainfall to have stronger negative effects on the households headed by
older individuals. The heterogeneity with respect to religion may be due, for example, to
differences in social capital and strength of informal risk sharing. The minority groups
usually cultivate more cohesive social network, and thus are likely to have better informal
risk-sharing. Also, for historical reasons, the minority groups such as Hindu’s in Bangladesh
are more likely to be traders and artisans, and rely less on agriculture compared to Mus-
lims.2 However, an obvious objection to such interaction based instruments is that age and
religious affiliation may have direct effect on the propensity to pay bribes. We thus control
for the possible direct effect of Muslim dummy and age of the household head in the IV
regressions.
(3) Primary and Secondary Education in Rural Bangladesh
The primary schooling (grades 1-5) in rural Bangladesh is dominated by public schools,
although there are also private and NGO operated schools. Almost 80 percent of enroll-
ment are into public and registered private schools. The public schools are financed by
government and a large part of the financing of the private schools also come from the
government. Bangladesh Government bears the 90 percent of the salary of the teachers in
registered private schools and also allocates funds for improvements and maintenance of
the school infrastructure. The NGO schools provide non-formal education to the poorest
section of the income distribution and are primarily located in areas not served by public
or private schools.
Bangladesh enacted compulsory primary education in 1990. It established a six member
‘compulsory primary education committee’ in the lowest tier of local government, the union
(a collection of villages). The committee was to ”ensure admission and regular presence of
all children of the area in primary schools” (GOB, 1990). The 1990 Act also had provisions
2In our data set, Muslim households own more lands on average and also more likely to be farmers and
unskilled laborers.
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for penalties for non-compliance. If the local committee or the parents were unable to
ensure attendance of the children in the village, they could be fined up to Tk. 200. But
in reality the penalty for noncompliance was not enforced. The primary schools in rural
areas, public, NGO, or private, are free for every child; there is no tuition or examination
fees. Government provides free books in all primary schools.
The secondary schooling (grades 6-10) infrastructure is dominated by ‘private schools’,
public schools play a smaller role. However, most of the ‘private secondary schools’ (regis-
tered ones) are primarily financed by the government, including teacher salary, and capital
spending, maintenance and repair of the schools. Tuition fees are charged in most of the
secondary schools, but the cost of education is lower in the religious secondary schools (Ed-
ucation Watch, 2005). Books are freely distributed by government in all secondary schools.
In January 1994, stipend was introduced for girls attending secondary schools. Under the
girls’ stipend program, all girls in rural areas who enter secondary school are eligible for
a monthly sum ranging from 25 taka in grade 6 to 60 taka in grade 10. They also receive
additional payments for new books. Three conditions need to be met for receiving stipend:
(i) a minimum of 75 percent attendance rate, (ii) at least a 45 percent score in annual
school exams, and (iii) staying unmarried until sitting the Secondary School Certificate or
turning 18. The girls stipend program seems to have a strong effect and the girls enrollment
in secondary schools have increased substantially in recent years.
Net enrollment rates in primary schools for boys and girls were 83 percent and 81
percent in 1996, and 84 and 96 percent in 2004. Quality of education is in general low, and
grade repetition and drop outs are major problems. The survival rate in primary school
was 55.3 percent in 1991 and 53.5 percent in 2004, showing little improvements. The net
enrollment rate in secondary schools was 38 percent for boys and 50 percent for girls in
2005 (Education Watch, 2005). There is clear evidence that poor households are at a
disadvantage: the net enrollment rate in secondary schools was 25 percent for food deficit
households and 59 percent for food surplus households.
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 Appendix Tables 
 
Table A.1: Summary Statistics           
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Propensity to pay bribe       
All including payment w/o receipts 3605 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
For Admission 3605 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00 
For Scholarship payments 3605 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
All excluding payment w/o receipts 3605 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Payment w/o receipts 3605 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Amount of bribe paid annually ('000 Taka)  1747 0.25 1.00 0.01 28.48 
Share of per capita monthly income paid as bribe 1747 0.14 0.35 0.00 7.01 
Monthly Per Capita household income (PCI) ('000 
Taka) 3605 2.30 1.97 0.20 31.83 
PCI of households paying bribe ('000 Taka) 1747 1.95 1.58 0.20 16.00 
PCI of households not paying bribe ('000 Taka) 1858 2.62 2.23 0.40 31.83 
Rainfall (mean over last 10 years) (milimetre) 3605 1592 417 1009 3299 
Deviation of 2009 Rainfall from its 10 year mean  3605 125 78 -674 1480 
Household Characteristics      
Head's education (years) 3605 9.67 3.81 0.00 18.00 
Landownership (Acre) 3605 1.40 2.41 0.00 38.06 
Membership and connection 3605 0.46 0.67 0.00 3.00 
Propensity to pay bribe for non-educational services 3605 0.38 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Household size 3605 5.85 2.18 2.00 21.00 
No. of School age children 3605 2.10 1.05 1.00 7.00 
Age of Head 3605 49.25 13.13 18.00 110.00 
Head female 3605 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Head Muslim 3605 0.86 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Village Level Variables      
Per capita Expenditure (taka) 3605 1714 640 660 4684 
Av. Propn. To pay bribe for non-educational services 3605 0.28 0.12 0.05 0.64 
Data Source: National Household Survey on Corruption (NHSC), 2010  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table A.2: Rivers and Vuong (1988)  CMLE Estimates for 
Propensity to Pay Bribes 
  
  Aggregate Admission 
With 
receipt 
Without 
Receipt 
Rainfall Shock     
Per capita income -0.0122 -0.0738 -0.0694 0.00795 
 (-0.125) (-1.476) (-1.213) (0.0807) 
First stage F 
Statistic 10.13 10.13 10.13 10.13 
     
Long-term Rainfall    
Per capita 
income -0.143** 
-
0.0985*** -0.129*** -0.0809 
 (-1.963) (-3.450) (-3.258) (-1.130) 
First stage F 
Statistic 11.22 11.22 11.22 11.22 
 
 
